- Code review
- 18 Nov 2026, OWASP Top 10 (2021), two passes
- Automated sweep
- 19 Nov 2026, 7 tools
- Sweep result
- 0 critical, 0 high findings
- Open items
- 5, listed on this page
- Report a problem
- security@sourceincluded.com
In short
Source Included is a small product run by one company, so this page does not lean on badges. It lists the controls that are in the code today, each with the file or test that proves it, the results of the last review and sweep, and the items that are still open.
- Findings fixed in the 18 Nov review, each with a test
- 12
- Critical or high findings in the 19 Nov sweep
- 0
- Items still open, listed below
- 5
What is in place
Application
Your browser talks to this site and to Cloudflare's bot check, nothing else. Every response carries a strict policy, and every form that can sign someone in refuses requests from other sites.
Content-Security-Policy
Scripts load only from this site and from Cloudflare Turnstile. No plugins, no framing by other sites, and forms may only post back here.
next.config.ts
Transport and isolation headers
HTTPS enforced for two years with preload. Pages cannot be framed, sniffed or embedded by another origin, and camera, microphone, location, payment and USB are switched off.
tests/unit/security-headers.test.ts
Bot check on every code request
Cloudflare Turnstile checks the sign-up form and every request for a new code before an email goes out. It stays invisible unless Cloudflare needs you to tick it.
src/lib/turnstile.ts
Cross-site requests refused
The sign-in routes answer 403 to a request from another site and 415 to anything that is not JSON, so a form elsewhere cannot sign you in to someone else's account.
src/lib/http.ts
No member text rendered as HTML
Questions, plans and AI answers never reach the page as raw HTML. They pass through a renderer that allows only web, mail, anchor and same-site links.
src/lib/markdown.tsx
AI answers screened and labelled
The brain's input screen blocked 150 of 150 red-team prompts. Every answer is labelled as AI-generated, as the EU AI Act, Article 50, requires.
tests/unit/brain-redteam.test.ts
Data
The database decides who reads what, not the page. It sits in Frankfurt and deletes old records on its own schedule.
Row-level security on every table
Visitors read nothing from member tables, and a member reads only their own rows. The member-only setup guides are closed to the public Data API by column grants.
migrations/0004_security.sql
Retention the database enforces
A scheduled job runs every day at 03:15 UTC: unconfirmed sign-ups go after 7 days, security logs after 90 days, closed accounts after 30 days, consent proof after 3 years.
migrations/0006_retention.sql
Salted hashes, never raw IPs
Rate limits and abuse records keep a salted SHA-256 hash of the network address, and of the email address for the per-address limits. The raw values are not stored.
src/lib/iphash.ts
No tracking cookie
The only cookies are the sign-in cookies. There is no analytics script, and campaign tags stay in the open page's memory, so nothing else is written to your device.
tests/e2e/signup.spec.ts
Hosted in Frankfurt
The database (Supabase), the server functions (Vercel, fra1) and the website scanner (Fly.io) run in Frankfurt. Email, the bot check and the AI model are listed with their locations in the Privacy policy.
vercel.json
A scanner that stays on the public web
The website scanner refuses private, loopback and cloud metadata addresses, pins the address it checked and checks again on every redirect.
scan-service SSRF guard
Access
There are no passwords to leak: you sign in with a one-time code sent by email. Sessions live in cookies that scripts on the page cannot read.
One-time codes, no passwords
Each sign-in uses a 6-digit code or the link in the same email. The Vault stores no password for anyone.
src/lib/auth/verify.ts
Limits on every guess
Code checks stop at 20 an hour per network and 10 an hour per address from any network. Sign-ups stop at 5 an hour per network, and a new code waits 60 seconds, at most 3 an hour per address.
src/lib/auth/*.ts
Session cookies scripts cannot read
Sign-in cookies are httpOnly, SameSite=Lax and Secure on HTTPS. The browser never talks to the database directly, so it never needs the token.
tests/unit/auth-cookies.test.ts
Server keys stay on the server
The database service key and the AI model key exist only in server code. A test walks the imports of every browser file and fails if one reaches them.
tests/unit/client-boundary.test.ts
Admin checked on every request
Every admin page and route checks the session and an allow-list of addresses on the server, not only in the page. A second factor for admin is still open, see below.
src/lib/admin.ts
Your own keys
The systems ship no keys. Each .env.example leaves every key empty and sets only defaults such as ports and model names, so the systems run on accounts you own.
systems/*/.env.example
What is not held
- No SOC 2 report. Source Included has not been audited for SOC 2.
- No ISO 27001 certificate. There is no certified information security management system.
- No third-party penetration test. The 18 Nov 2026 review and the 19 Nov 2026 sweep were done in-house.
- No bug bounty. Reports are welcome and credited if you wish, but not paid.
Personal data is handled as the Privacy policy describes, with every processor and where it stores data.
The security sweep
On 19 Nov 2026 the Vault's code, its dependencies and a running local copy were checked with 7 tools, plus npm audit. They reported 19 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 8 medium, 1 low and 10 for information. Each one was read and given a verdict.
| Tool | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Gitleaks 8.30.1 | Secrets in the files | 2 hits, both local development keys in an ignored file that never ships |
| TruffleHog 3.99.9 | Secrets, verified against the provider | 0 verified secrets |
| Semgrep 1.185.0 | Risky code patterns | 6 findings: 2 hygiene fixes, 4 false positives |
| OSV-Scanner 2.7.0 | Known vulnerable dependencies | 0 advisories |
| Trivy 0.76.2 | Dependencies and configuration | 0 vulnerabilities, 0 misconfigurations |
| OWASP ZAP 2.17.0 | The running site, passive scan and spider | 10 alert types: 2 fixed, the rest false positives |
| nuclei 3.11.1 | The running site, safe templates only | 4 matches: 2 headers added, 1 skipped, 1 accepted |
Fixed after the sweep:
- The sign-up and code forms post to a page that explains sign-in needs JavaScript, so a form sent before the page loads never puts your address or code in a URL.
- Your address moves from the sign-up form to the code page in memory, not in the link, so it stays out of server logs and the browser history.
- Two headers added: Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy same-origin and X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies none. Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy was left out, because it would block the Turnstile frame.
- Invisible and bidirectional characters in two text filters are now written as escapes, so the source reads the same to a reviewer as to the compiler.
Open items
From the 18 Nov 2026 review. These are settings and processes, not findings in the code: the 19 Nov 2026 sweep found 0 critical and 0 high, while O1 is a provider limit set at deploy and rated High until it is set. An item leaves this list only when it is closed, and the date says when.
- O1
Sign-in provider limits per network
The sign-in provider counts its limits per network address, and every call reaches it from the host's few addresses. They are raised at deploy; the Vault's own limits use your real address and stay in force.
- Severity
- High until set
- Status
- Open, set at deploy
- Owner
- Adrian
- O2
Second factor for admin
Admin sign-in is an email code to an allow-listed address. 2-step verification on that mailbox comes first, then an app-level second factor.
- Severity
- Medium
- Status
- Open
- Owner
- Adrian, then the next sprint
- O3
Flags that pull a brain card
Three accounts flagging an answer take the cited card out until it is checked again. Abuse can empty the brain, but it leaks nothing. Watched during launch week.
- Severity
- Medium
- Status
- Open, needs a decision
- Owner
- Adrian
- O4
Direct calls to the sign-in provider
Someone holding the public project key could ask the sign-in provider for a code without the bot check. Such accounts get no member record and see nothing. The key is in no browser file. A database check now refuses any new account that the Vault's own sign-up form did not start.
- Severity
- Low
- Status
- Fix built, switched on at deploy
- Owner
- Adrian, at deploy
- O5
Inline scripts allowed by the policy
Next.js writes its page data as inline scripts, so the policy allows them. Nonces would switch off the static pages. No member text is ever rendered as HTML.
- Severity
- Low
- Status
- Accepted
- Owner
- Revisit if a page ever renders untrusted HTML
- O6
Advisories in development tools
The test tools carried 16 advisories on 18 Nov. After the update, npm audit (development tools included) and OSV-Scanner report 0.
- Severity
- Info
- Status
- Closed 19 Nov 2026
- Owner
- Maintenance
Report a vulnerability
Email security@sourceincluded.com. The same address is in /.well-known/security.txt. Please include:
- The page or address, and what you did, step by step
- What you could see or change that you should not
- How to reach you, and whether you want to be credited
While you look:
- Test with your own account only, and stop as soon as you can see another member's data
- Do not change or delete data, and do not keep what you saw
- No load tests, denial of service, spam or social engineering
- Give us a fair time to fix it before you publish
Every report gets an answer, and the fix goes into the build log, with your name if you want it there.
